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# <img src="frontend/public/favicon.svg" width="22" height="22" alt="" /> Stupid Simple Network Inventory
![Python](https://img.shields.io/badge/Python-3.11-3776AB?logo=python&logoColor=white)
![FastAPI](https://img.shields.io/badge/FastAPI-009688?logo=fastapi&logoColor=white)
![Vue.js](https://img.shields.io/badge/Vue.js-3-4FC08D?logo=vue.js&logoColor=white)
![SQLite](https://img.shields.io/badge/SQLite-003B57?logo=sqlite&logoColor=white)
![Nginx](https://img.shields.io/badge/Nginx-009639?logo=nginx&logoColor=white)
![Docker](https://img.shields.io/badge/Docker-2496ED?logo=docker&logoColor=white)
Self-hosted web application for manual network inventory and logical network topology visualisation.
## Features
- **Manual inventory** — add and manage devices (18 types) with IPs, VLANs, descriptions and optional web links
- **Topology view** — card-based layout per network (LAN / VLAN 802.1Q), with WAN and gateway sections
- **ICMP ping sweep** — check reachability of all known hosts in one click
- **Auto-discovery** — ping sweep + PTR DNS lookup on a subnet to import new hosts
- **Authentication** — JWT-based login with forced password change on first use
- **Dark mode** — light / dark theme toggle
- **i18n** — French, English, Spanish
## Stack
| Layer | Technology |
|-------|-----------|
| Backend | FastAPI + SQLAlchemy + SQLite (Python 3.11) |
| Frontend | Vue 3 + Vite, served by Nginx |
| Auth | JWT HS256, 24-hour expiry |
| Runtime | Docker Compose |
---
## Quick start
```bash
# 1. Clone and enter the project
git clone https://git.raspot.in/olivier/stupid-simple-network-inventory.git
cd stupid-simple-network-inventory
# 2. Create the data directory owned by the current user
mkdir -p db_data
# 3. Configure environment (required for correct bind-mount ownership)
cp .env.example .env
# Edit .env:
# DOCKER_UID / DOCKER_GID → output of: id -u && id -g
# INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD → set to avoid the default admin/admin bootstrap
# 4. Build and start
docker compose --env-file .env up --build -d
# 5. Open http://localhost:8080 in your browser
```
### First login
| Case | Credentials | Behaviour |
|------|------------|-----------|
| `INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD` set | `admin` / `<your password>` | Normal login |
| `INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD` unset | `admin` / `admin` | Forced password change before accessing the app |
---
## Configuration
All configuration is via environment variables. See `.env.example` for the full list with descriptions.
| Variable | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `SECRET_KEY` | auto-generated | JWT signing key. Set explicitly in production. |
| `INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD` | _(empty)_ | Bootstrap admin password. If unset, `admin/admin` is used with forced change. |
| `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | `*` | CORS allowed origins (comma-separated). Set to your domain in production. |
| `BIND_ADDRESS` | `0.0.0.0` | IP address to listen on. Set to the interface facing the reverse proxy. |
| `DOCKER_UID` / `DOCKER_GID` | `1000` | UID/GID for the backend process. Must match the host user owning `./db_data/`. |
### Using .env with Docker Compose
```bash
cp .env.example .env
# Edit .env — at minimum set DOCKER_UID, DOCKER_GID, INITIAL_ADMIN_PASSWORD
docker compose --env-file .env up --build -d
```
---
## Security
### Secret management
Two options depending on your security requirements.
#### Option A — Auto-generated secret (recommended for single-node)
Leave `SECRET_KEY` unset (or empty) in `.env`. On first start the backend generates a random 64-character hex key, writes it to `db_data/secret_key.txt` with permissions **0600**, and reuses it on every subsequent restart. The secret never appears in an environment variable, a compose file, or a log.
```bash
# .env — leave the line empty or remove it
SECRET_KEY=
```
The only requirement is that `db_data/` is backed up (it already contains the database).
#### Option B — Docker Compose file secret
Stores the secret in a file on the host, outside version control, and mounts it into the container. The value never appears in an environment variable.
```bash
# Generate and store the secret outside the project directory
mkdir -p ~/.secrets
python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_hex(32))" > ~/.secrets/topologie_secret_key
chmod 600 ~/.secrets/topologie_secret_key
```
Then uncomment the `secrets:` blocks in `docker-compose.yml` (see comments in that file) and remove `SECRET_KEY` from `.env`. Docker Compose merges the override automatically:
```bash
docker compose up -d
```
---
### Key rotation
To rotate the JWT secret (invalidates all active sessions):
```bash
# Option A — environment variable (recommended)
# Set a new SECRET_KEY in your deployment config and restart
# Option B — file rotation
docker compose stop backend
rm db_data/secret_key.txt
docker compose start backend
# All users will need to log in again
```
### HTTPS
This application does not terminate TLS. For production use, place it behind a reverse proxy that handles HTTPS:
```nginx
# Example nginx reverse-proxy (external, on the host or a dedicated container)
server {
listen 443 ssl;
server_name inventory.example.com;
ssl_certificate /etc/letsencrypt/live/inventory.example.com/fullchain.pem;
ssl_certificate_key /etc/letsencrypt/live/inventory.example.com/privkey.pem;
location / {
proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080;
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto $scheme;
}
}
```
For local-only use, bind to loopback to prevent accidental LAN exposure:
```yaml
# docker-compose.override.yml
services:
frontend:
ports:
- "127.0.0.1:8080:8080"
```
### Container hardening
The containers run with reduced privileges:
| Measure | Backend | Frontend |
|---------|---------|----------|
| Non-root user | `DOCKER_UID:DOCKER_GID` (host user) | `nginx` (UID 101) |
| `cap_drop: ALL` | ✓ | ✓ |
| `cap_add: NET_RAW` | ✓ (ping) | — |
| `no-new-privileges` | — ¹ | ✓ |
| Healthcheck | ✓ | ✓ |
¹ Omitted on the backend: ping uses file capabilities (`cap_net_raw=ep`); `no-new-privileges` suppresses the file effective bit and would prevent the subprocess from acquiring `CAP_NET_RAW` in its effective set even though the parent holds it in its permitted set.
---
## Data persistence
All data is stored in `./db_data/`:
| File | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `topology.db` | SQLite database |
| `secret_key.txt` | Auto-generated JWT secret (0600 permissions) |
**Backup**: `cp -r db_data/ db_data.bak/`
**Restore**: stop the stack, replace `db_data/`, restart.
---
## Development
### Backend tests
```bash
cd backend
pip install -r requirements.txt -r requirements-test.txt
pytest tests/ -v
```
### Local dev (without Docker)
```bash
# Backend
cd backend
pip install -r requirements.txt
uvicorn main:app --reload
# Frontend (separate terminal)
cd frontend
npm install
npm run dev # Vite dev server on :5173, proxies /api/ to :8000
```
---
## Architecture
See [`docs/architecture.md`](docs/architecture.md) for the detailed request flow, Docker setup, and authentication model.